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CASE NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Recent Developments in Wyoming’s
Reasonableness Requirement Applied to the Search Incident
to Arrest Exception; Holman v. State, 183 P.3d 368 (Wyo. 2008).
-ARYT , &REDRICKSON

INTRODUCTION
On July 28, 2005, police ofﬁcer Joseph Moody was sitting in his parked
patrol car near the North Casper ball ﬁelds in Casper, Wyoming when a citizen
approached and reported suspicious activity.1 The citizen saw a man in a parked
car watching children through a pair of binoculars, and the man kept moving
his car when people noticed him.2 Ofﬁcer Moody initiated a trafﬁc stop of the
vehicle the citizen identiﬁed.3 The single occupant explained he used a monocular
to look for his two sons playing in an event in the ball ﬁelds.4 Ofﬁcer Moody
requested the man’s driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance.5 The
driver, Daniel Holman (“Holman”), provided a state-issued identiﬁcation card
instead of a driver’s license.6
Ofﬁcer Moody learned from police dispatch that Holman’s driver’s license
was suspended.7 Another ofﬁcer arrived at the scene, and the two ofﬁcers arrested
Holman for driving with a suspended license.8 After placing Holman in the back
of the patrol car, the two ofﬁcers searched Holman’s vehicle and discovered a
plastic bag containing a small amount of methamphetamine in the center console
between the two front seats.9

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2010. I would like to thank the Wyoming
,AW 2EVIEW Board for their assistance with this project. I would also like to thank Professor Eric
Johnson for his valuable time and insights. I extend my most sincere gratitude to my partner, Alan
Bartholomew, for his love and support throughout this project and always.
1

Holman v. State, 183 P.3d 368, 370 (Wyo. 2008).

2

Id. At Holman’s preliminary hearing, the ofﬁcer described Holman’s behavior as “skittish.”
Brief of Appellant at 8, Holman, 183 P.3d 368 (No. 06-140) (Aug. 2, 2006), 2006 WL 5953239.
3
Brief of Appellant, Holman, supra note 2, at 3, 9. Ofﬁcer Moody testiﬁed he initiated the stop
to investigate whether the driver was a pedophile engaged in indecent exposure or masturbation in
the park while watching children. Id. at 3.
4

Holman, 183 P.3d at 370.

5

Id.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id. Casper police regularly make arrests for driving under suspension as a general police
practice. Pierce v. State, 171 P.3d 525, 527 n.2. (Wyo. 2007).
9

Holman, 183 P.3d at 370–71.
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The State charged Holman with third, or subsequent, possession of a controlled
substance.10 Holman moved to suppress the evidence of the drug charge, but
the trial court denied his motion.11 At the preliminary hearing, and again at the
hearing for the motion to suppress, Ofﬁcer Moody testiﬁed he searched Holman’s
vehicle “incident to arrest” because such searches were standard police procedure.12
Holman pled guilty to the drug charge, but reserved his right to appeal the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress.13 On appeal, Holman argued the district
court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the search of his vehicle
was unreasonable, and therefore violated the Wyoming Constitution’s search and
seizure provision.14 The Wyoming Supreme Court applied its unique “reasonable
under all of the circumstances” test, and agreed with Holman—the warrantless
search of Holman’s vehicle was unreasonable and, thereby, unconstitutional.15
This case note examines the recent shift in Wyoming’s reasonable under all of
the circumstances approach as applied to the search incident to arrest exception
for warrantless searches.16 The background section of this note brieﬂy addresses
Wyoming’s departure from Fourth Amendment precedent in all warrantless
searches, but comprehensively reviews the small body of independent Wyoming
case law applying the search incident to arrest exception leading up to the Holman
decision.17 Particular attention is given to Holman’s two companion cases: 0IERCE V
State and Sam v. State.18 This note argues that Holman caps a triumvirate of cases
that replaced the reasonable under all of the circumstances test with a requirement
for reasonable grounds.19 Furthermore, while the Wyoming Supreme Court failed
to articulate in Holman which category of reasonable grounds applies to the search
incident to arrest exception, this note determines reasonable suspicion is the only
logical choice.20 Finally, this note concludes the search incident to arrest analysis
only considers circumstances that support a ﬁnding of reasonable suspicion, which

10

Id. at 371 (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1031(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2007)).

11

Id.

12

Id. at 372.

Id. at 370 (citing, mistakenly, WYO. R. CR. P. 11(e)). WYO. R. CR. P. 11(e) governs plea
agreement procedures. Holman did not plead under WYO. R. CR. P. 11(e); he entered a conditional
plea under WYO. R. CR. P. 11(a)(2). Brief of Appellant, Holman, supra note 2, at 2. WYO. R. CR.
P. 11(a)(2) provides for the entry of a conditional plea with preservation of the right to appeal the
denial of a pretrial motion.
13

Brief of Appellant, Holman, supra note 2, at 11–12 (citing WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 4). Holman
also argued the warrantless search violated the Wyoming Constitution and the Fourth Amendment
because the ofﬁcer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity under the investigatory detention
exception. Id. at 4–10.
14

15

Holman, 183 P.3d 368.

16

See infra notes 83–285 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 53–132 and accompanying text.

18

See infra notes 83–132 and accompanying text.

19

See infra notes 188–94 and accompanying text.

20

See infra notes 201–29 and accompanying text.
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is far less than all of the circumstances, but nevertheless provides helpful guidance
for law enforcement and practitioners.21

BACKGROUND
Both the United States Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures.22 Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable
under both the Fourth Amendment and the Wyoming Constitution.23 The
United States Supreme Court has developed a set of exceptions that indicate
whether a search is reasonable.24 Federal Fourth Amendment cases treat these
exceptions as bright-lines; if a factual scenario ﬁts into one of the exceptions, then
the warrantless search is reasonable.25 The Wyoming Supreme Court recognizes
and applies the same exceptions, but imposes an additional requirement.26
All warrantless searches, regardless of the applicable exception, must meet the

21

See infra notes 230–85 and accompanying text.

Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or afﬁrmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”), WITH WYO. CONST.
art. 1, § 4 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by afﬁdavit, particularly describing the place to be searched or the person
or thing to be seized.”).
22

23
%G, Fenton v. State, 154 P.3d 974, 975 (Wyo. 2007) (“We have stated that under both
constitutions, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they are justiﬁed
by probable cause and established exceptions.”) (citing Morris v. State, 908 P.2d 931, 935 (Wyo.
1995)); U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (“[I]t is a cardinal principle that ‘searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few speciﬁcally established and well-delineated
exceptions.’”) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
24

Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

25

Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 482 (1999) (“The [United States] Supreme Court majority
believed it was a reasonable construction of the Fourth Amendment to formulate bright-line rules.”)
(citations omitted).
26
O’Boyle v. State, 117 P.3d 401, 409 (Wyo. 2005). Some of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement recognized in Wyoming include: search of an arrested suspect and the area within his
control (search incident to arrest); search conducted while in pursuit of a ﬂeeing suspect; search
and seizure to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence; search and seizure of an automobile
based upon probable cause (the automobile exception); search which results when an object is in
plain view of ofﬁcers in a place where they have a right to be (plain view doctrine); search which
results from entering a dwelling to save life or property (emergency assistance exception); search
of an impounded vehicle without probable cause (inventory search); weapons frisk of an arrestee’s
companion without probable cause (automatic companion rule); search justiﬁed by reasonable
suspicion arising from a stop to render aid (community caretaker function); and search justiﬁed by
reasonable suspicion or probable cause during an investigatory detention (investigatory detention
exception). Speten v. State, 185 P.3d 25, 28 (Wyo. 2008).
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Wyoming Supreme Court’s “reasonable under all of the circumstances” test or be
found unconstitutional.27

Searches Incident to Arrest Under the Fourth Amendment
Understanding Wyoming’s divergence from federal search incident to arrest
jurisprudence requires a basic understanding of the federal exception.28 In 7EEKS
v. United States, the United States Supreme Court recognized that some type of
search incident to arrest has been permitted throughout Anglo-American history.29
A search of an arrestee’s person was customary in order to either conﬁscate weapons
or conﬁscate evidence.30 However, the scope of the search incident to arrest beyond
the search of the person has been the subject of extensive dispute.31 The United
States Supreme Court established a bright-line rule in its 1969 decision, Chimel
v. United States, deﬁning the appropriate scope of searches incident to arrest.32 In
Chimel, the Court authorized searches incident to arrest in “the area within the
arrestee’s immediate control,” which means the area in which the suspect could
reach either weapons or evidence.33 The Chimel Court supported this limited
scope by reiterating the two fundamental reasons for allowing searches incident to
arrest in the ﬁrst place: to prevent the arrestee from destroying evidence or from
reaching weapons.34 Post-Chimel decisions left unsettled whether the interior of
an automobile (the area within the arrestee’s immediate control just prior to the
arrest) remained in the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest.35

27

/"OYLE, 117 P.3d at 409.

28

See generally Kenneth Decock & Erin Mercer, Comment, "ALANCING THE 3CALES OF *USTICE
(OW 7ILL Vasquez v. State Affect Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest in Wyoming, 1 WYO. L. REV.
139, 140–41 (2001) (exploring Wyoming’s rejection of the bright-line approach of federal search
incident to arrest jurisprudence).
29

232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); see also U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (explaining
the search incident to arrest exception has two prongs: (1) authorizing a search of an arrestee’s
person, and (2) authorizing a search of the area within the arrestee’s immediate control).
30

7EEKS, 232 U.S. at 392.

31

See generally Decock & Mercer, supra note 28, at 139–57 (exploring the history of searches
incident to arrest in federal and Wyoming courts leading up to and including the Wyoming Supreme
Court’s seminal 1999 decision in 6ASQUEZ). The history of searches incident to arrest is also reviewed
in Chimel v. U.S., 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and 2OBINSON, 414 U.S. at 224–26.
32

395 U.S. 752.

33

Id. at 768.

Id. See generally 3 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH
Chimel).
34

AND

SEIZURE § 7.1(a) (3d ed. 1996) (evaluating

35

N.Y. v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (“While the Chimel case established that a
search incident to an arrest may not stray beyond the area within the immediate control of the
arrestee, courts have found no workable deﬁnition of ‘the area within the immediate control of the
arrestee’ when that area arguably includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is its recent
occupant.”). State courts reﬂected the same inconsistency. Id. at 459 n.1; see also 3 LAFAVE, supra
note 34, § 7.1(a) (reviewing federal case law leading up to the Belton decision).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol9/iss1/6

4

Frederickson: Constitutional Law - Recent Developments in Wyoming's Reasonablen

CASE NOTE

2009

199

Eleven years after Chimel, the Court created another bright-line rule in .EW
9ORK V "ELTON to close the debate over the appropriate scope of vehicle searches
incident to arrest.36 In Belton, an ofﬁcer initiated a trafﬁc stop for a speeding
violation and subsequently noticed an envelope on the ﬂoor of the vehicle
labeled “Supergold,” which the ofﬁcer associated with marijuana.37 Based on this
association, and an odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle, the ofﬁcer
had probable cause to believe the vehicle’s occupants possessed marijuana.38 The
ofﬁcer arrested the four occupants based on such probable cause and proceeded
to search the interior of the vehicle incident to the arrests.39 The ofﬁcer discovered
cocaine inside a jacket left inside the vehicle.40 The Court addressed the issue of
whether containers inside a vehicle, like the jacket, are within the proper scope
of a vehicle search conducted incident to arrest.41 The Court upheld the search of
the vehicle’s interior, including the jacket pocket or any other closed container,
as valid under the Fourth Amendment.42 The lawful arrest, by itself, justiﬁed
a broad search and outweighed any expectation of privacy.43 The Belton Court
further reasoned that law enforcement needs bright-line policies to apply in the
ﬁeld, because ofﬁcers have limited time and expertise to analyze the individual
circumstances confronted in each arrest.44

Searches Incident to Arrest Under the Wyoming Constitution
Article 1, section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures analogous to the Fourth Amendment.45 In its early search
36

Belton, 453 U.S. at 460–61; see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 n.14 (1983)
(discussing the bright-line rule of Belton).
37

Belton, 453 U.S. at 455–56. The ofﬁcer knew from his experience that the term “Supergold”
referred to marijuana. Brief of Petitioner at 2–3, Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (No. 80-328) (March 4,
1980), 1980 WL 339862.
38

Brief of Respondent at 1, Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (No. 80-328) (April 3, 1981), 1981 WL
390386.
39

Belton, 453 U.S at 455–56. The envelope labeled “Supergold” did in fact contain marijuana,
but the ofﬁcer did not discover this fact until after completing the arrests. Id. at 456.
40

Id.

41

Id. at 459.

42

Id. at 460–62.

43

Id. at 461. The expectation of privacy became the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment in
the mid-twentieth century. +ATZ, 389 U.S. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304–06 (1967) (analyzing the shift in federal search and seizure jurisprudence
from the protection of property interests to the protection of privacy interests).
44

Belton, 453 U.S at 458 (discussing Wayne R. LaFave, h#ASE "Y #ASE !DJUDICATIONv 6ERSUS
h3TANDARDIZED 0ROCEDURESv 4HE 2OBINSON $ILEMMA, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 142 (1974)). Contra
Wayne R. LaFave, 4HE &OURTH !MENDMENT )N AN )MPERFECT 7ORLD /N $RAWING @"RIGHT ,INES AND
@'OOD &AITH, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 325–33 (1982) (criticizing the Belton decision and advocating
against a bright line despite the needs of law enforcement).
45

WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 4; see supra note 22.
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and seizure decisions, the Wyoming Supreme Court relied on Federal Fourth
Amendment cases and case law from other states to interpret Wyoming’s search
and seizure provision.46 The development of Wyoming’s search and seizure
provision came to a halt in 1949, when the United States Supreme Court decided
Wolf v. Colorado, which held states must, at a minimum, provide the protections
of the Fourth Amendment.47 In 1961, the United States Supreme Court went a
step further when it declared, in -APP V /HIO, states must apply the exclusionary
rule to evidence acquired in violation of the Fourth Amendment.48 Accordingly,
the Wyoming Supreme Court exclusively applied Fourth Amendment principles
to search and seizure cases until the late twentieth century when many states
returned to independent state constitutional interpretation.49
When Belton empowered law enforcement to conduct thorough vehicle
searches per se, incident to arrest, including closed containers, many state courts
turned away from the federal rule by recognizing greater protection under state
constitutions.50 In 1992, the Wyoming Supreme Court asked litigants to fully brief
state constitutional arguments, using a “precise, analytically sound approach,”
to provide the court the opportunity to evaluate whether its state constitution
afforded greater protections than the Fourth Amendment.51 In 6ASQUEZ V 3TATE,
issued in 1999, a litigant ﬁnally presented the constitutional argument the court
needed to rekindle its analysis of the Wyoming Constitution’s search and seizure
provision.52

46

Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 483–84 (1999); see State v. Petersen, 194 P. 342 (Wyo. 1920);
State v. George, 223 P. 683 (Wyo. 1924); State v. Crump, 246 P. 241 (Wyo. 1926).
47

338 U.S. 25 (1949). The Wyoming Supreme Court stated it abandoned independent state
search and seizure jurisprudence earlier, in the 1920’s and 1930’s. 6ASQUEZ, 990 P.2d at 483–84.
48

367 U.S. 643 (1963). The exclusionary rule requires courts to deny admission of evidence
acquired in violation of the Fourth Amendment in order to deter unreasonable searches. See generally
1 LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 1.1 (exploring the history and purpose of the exclusionary rule).
49

6ASQUEZ, 990 P.2d at 483–84. See generally , Robert B. Keiter, !N %SSAY ON 7YOMING
Constitutional Interpretation, 21 LAND & WATER L. REV. 527 (1989) (analyzing the rebirth of state
constitutional interpretation and methods to facilitate state constitutional analysis).
50

6ASQUEZ, 990 P.2d at 482 -APP required states to provide a minimum of Fourth Amendment
protections, but did not prevent states from providing more protection under state constitutions. Id.
at 484 (discussing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961)); /"OYLE, 117 P.3d at 408. State
court decisions rejecting Belton in favor of greater protection under state constitutions include:
State v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982); Commonwealth v. Toole, 448 N.E.2d 1264,
1266–68 (Mass. 1983); State v. Harnisch, 931 P.2d 1359, 1365–66 (Nev. 1997); State v. Pierce,
642 A.2d 947, 960 (N.J. 1994); State v. Rowell, 188 P.3d 95, 101 (N.M. 2008); People v. Blasitch,
541 N.E.2d 40, 44–45 (N.Y. 1989); State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d 93, 97 (N.Dak. 1993); State v.
Brown, 588 N.E.2d 113, 114–15 (Ohio 1992); Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 902 (Pa.
1992); State v. Bauder, 924 A.2d 38, 47 (Vt. 2007); State v. Stroud, 720 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Wash.
1986).
51
Dworkin v. LFP, Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 909 (Wyo. 1992); Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604,
621–24 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring).
52

6ASQUEZ, 990 P.2d at 483–84.
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6ASQUEZ V 3TATE
6ASQUEZ V 3TATE is the foundation for the Wyoming Supreme Court’s modern
search and seizure jurisprudence under the state constitution.53 In 6ASQUEZ,
ofﬁcers arrested the appellant for driving while intoxicated.54 The ofﬁcers noticed
empty ammunition shells in the bed of the appellant’s truck, and subsequently
searched the vehicle and its two passengers for any weapons posing a threat to
the ofﬁcers’ or public safety.55 In the fuse box, the ofﬁcers discovered a plastic
bag containing cocaine.56 Under the Fourth Amendment, pursuant to Belton, the
permissible scope of the warrantless vehicle search incident to arrest included
opening the closed fuse box.57 The appellant argued the Wyoming Constitution
provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment and presented a precise,
analytically sound state constitutional argument.58 The Wyoming Supreme Court
partially agreed with the argument: it concluded Wyoming’s search and seizure
provision provides greater protections than its federal counterpart, but still upheld
the warrantless search of the vehicle’s fuse box.59
The Wyoming Supreme Court imposed, in 6ASQUEZ, a requirement that every
warrantless search be “reasonable under all of the circumstances.”60 The court
held a warrantless search conducted incident to arrest meets this reasonableness
requirement if performed for one of two reasons: (1) to prevent the arrestee from
reaching weapons posing a threat to ofﬁcer safety, or (2) to prevent the arrestee
from concealing or destroying evidence.61 In 6ASQUEZ, both policy reasons were
present.62 First, the court held an arrest for suspected driving under the inﬂuence

53
See, e.g., 6ASQUEZ, 990 P.2d at 489; Holman, 183 P.3d at 371; /"OYLE, 117 P.3d at 409;
Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 308 (Wyo. 1999).
54

6ASQUEZ, 990 P.2d at 479.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id. at 482; see supra notes 36–44 and accompanying text (reviewing the Belton holding).

58

6ASQUEZ, 990 P.2d at 484. Vasquez presented his argument by applying the six-factor analysis
Justice Golden recommended to the practicing bar. Id. (referring to Saldana, 846 P.2d at 621–24
(Golden, J., concurring)).
59

Id. at 489. The state constitution provides greater protection because all searches must be
“reasonable under all of the circumstances,” a requirement the Wyoming Supreme Court resurrected
from its pre--APP decisions. Id. at 488–89 (citing the reasonableness standard from State v. Kelly,
268 P. 571 (Wyo. 1928) and State v. Peterson, 194 P. 342, 345 (Wyo. 1920)). Wyoming’s search
and seizure provision is also stronger than its federal counterpart because the state provision requires
an afﬁdavit, as opposed to merely an oath or afﬁrmation. Fertig v. State, 146 P.3d 492, 497 (Wyo.
2006) (citing 0ETERSON, 194 P. at 345).
60

6ASQUEZ, 990 P.2d at 489.

61

Id.; see also supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text (reviewing the United States Supreme
Court’s similar policy based reasoning in Chimel).
62

6ASQUEZ, 990 P.2d at 488–489.
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justiﬁed a search for evidence of intoxication.63 Second, the ammunition shells in
the bed of the truck raised an issue of ofﬁcer safety because the vehicle’s occupants
might possess the gun matching the empty shells.64

-ODERN #ASES 0RECEDING THE (OLMAN 4RIUMVIRATE
The Wyoming Supreme Court predicted in 6ASQUEZ that a vehicle search
incident to arrest would rarely fail its reasonable under all of the circumstances
test.65 In the seven years following 6ASQUEZ, only three Wyoming cases analyzed
the search incident to arrest exception under the Wyoming Constitution.66 True
to the court’s prediction, the court upheld all three searches as reasonable.67 In the
ﬁrst case, !NDREWS V 3TATE, the appellant placed his wallet on a counter next to him
when the police informed him of his arrest for burglary.68 The police searched the
wallet incident to the arrest and discovered stolen coins and credit cards similar
to items stolen in the burglary.69 The State justiﬁed its search and subsequent
seizure of the wallet under the search incident to arrest exception.70 The Wyoming
Supreme Court held the search reasonable under all of the circumstances because
the wallet was in the area of the arrestee’s immediate control at the time of arrest,
63

Id. at 488.

64

Id.

65

Id. at 489.

66

Clark v. State, 138 P.3d 677, 682–83 (Wyo. 2006); Cotton v. State, 119 P.3d 931, 936 (Wyo.
2005); Andrews v. State, 40 P.3d 708, 715 (Wyo. 2002). The sparse existence of case law in this area
is due to the failure of defendants to properly raise state constitutional challenges using the “precise,
analytically sound approach” required by the Wyoming Supreme Court. See $WORKIN, 839 P.2d
at 909; Fertig, 146 P.3d at 492–501. The Wyoming Supreme Court dismisses state constitutional
claims and decides search and seizure cases under the Fourth Amendment if the appellant fails to
raise the state constitutional challenge sufﬁciently at the trial and appellate levels. %G, LaPlant v.
State, 148 P.3d 4, 7 (Wyo. 2006) (dismissing the state constitutional claim for failure to raise the
issue to the trial court); Bailey v. State, 12 P.3d 173, 177–78 (Wyo. 2000) (dismissing the state
constitutional claim on appeal for failing to raise the Wyoming Constitution in the motion to
suppress). One method of meeting this “precise, analytically sound” requirement uses the six-factor
analysis recommended in Justice Golden’s concurring opinion in Saldana, 846 P.2d at 621–24
(Golden, J., concurring). Another method uses the three part analysis recommended in $WORKIN.
Lovato v. State, 901 P.2d 408, 413 (Wyo. 1995) (explaining $WORKIN and Saldana each demonstrate
an acceptable constitutional argument).
67

#LARK, 138 P.3d at 682–83 (upholding the warrantless search under the ofﬁcer safety prong
of the search incident to arrest exception); Cotton, 119 P.3d at 936 (upholding the warrantless
search under the ofﬁcer safety prong of the search incident to arrest exception); !NDREWS, 40 P.3d at
715 (upholding the warrantless search under the evidentiary prong of the search incident to arrest
exception).
68

40 P.3d at 715.

69

Id. at 711.

70

Id. at 712. When a defendant objects to evidence obtained without a warrant, the State bears
the burden to prove an exception justiﬁed the search and seizure. Mickelson v. State, 906 P.2d 1020,
1022 (Wyo. 1995); accord Fenton v. State, 154 P.3d 974, 975–76 (Wyo. 2007); Pena v. State, 98
P.3d 857, 870 (Wyo. 2007).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol9/iss1/6

8

Frederickson: Constitutional Law - Recent Developments in Wyoming's Reasonablen

CASE NOTE

2009

203

and the wallet likely contained evidence of the burglary for which the defendant
was arrested.71
The Wyoming Supreme Court analyzed a search incident to arrest under
the Wyoming Constitution for the second time in Cotton v. State.72 In Cotton,
the ofﬁcers arrested the appellant for driving with a suspended license, and the
appellant asked the passenger in his vehicle to retrieve a shirt from the vehicle
and take the shirt home.73 The ofﬁcers retrieved the shirt from the vehicle and
searched it before surrendering the item to the passenger, in order to conﬁrm
neither the vehicle nor the shirt contained a weapon the passenger could use
against the ofﬁcers.74 The ofﬁcers discovered cocaine in the shirt’s pocket.75 The
State raised the search incident to arrest exception to justify the search of the
shirt and the inside of the vehicle.76 The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the
scope of the search as reasonable under all of the circumstances because the search
addressed ofﬁcer safety concerns.77
The Wyoming Supreme Court analyzed a search conducted incident to arrest
under the Wyoming Constitution for the third time in #LARK V 3TATE.78 In #LARK, the
ofﬁcers arrested the appellant for driving with a suspended license.79 The ofﬁcers
searched the driver’s area of the interior of the vehicle incident to the arrest and
discovered marijuana inside a box sealed with duct tape.80 The Wyoming Supreme
Court upheld the scope of the search as reasonable under all of the circumstances
because the presence of an intoxicated passenger raised ofﬁcer safety concerns.81
The court further concluded ofﬁcer safety concerns existed because someone
inside the vehicle covered up the box after the ofﬁcer noticed it at the beginning
of the trafﬁc stop.82

71

!NDREWS, 40 P.3d at 715. The arrestee was suspected of stealing coins and cash. Id.

72

119 P.3d at 936.

73

Id. at 932, 936.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id. at 932.

77

Cotton, 119 P.3d at 935–36. The Wyoming Supreme Court later re-characterized its Cotton
holding as illustrating the automatic companion rule. Speten, 185 P.3d at 32. The automatic
companion rule permits a warrantless pat-down search of an arrestee’s companion without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to afﬁrm ofﬁcer safety. Id.
78

138 P.3d 677, 682–83 (Wyo. 2006).

79

Id. at 679, 682.

80

Id.

81

Id. at 682.

82

Id.
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4HE &IRST 4WO #ASES IN THE (OLMAN 4RIUMVIRATE Pierce v. State and Sam v.
State
The Wyoming Supreme Court invalidated a vehicle search incident to arrest
for the ﬁrst time under its reasonable under all of the circumstances approach
in the landmark case of 0IERCE V 3TATE.83 In 0IERCE, a police ofﬁcer approached a
car illegally parked in a city park.84 The ofﬁcer asked to see the driver’s license of
the vehicle’s sole occupant, Roy Pierce (“Pierce”), and his proof of insurance.85
Pierce provided a Montana license and told the ofﬁcer the license was suspended
and he did not maintain insurance on the vehicle.86 Police dispatch conﬁrmed
the suspension of Pierce’s license.87 Another ofﬁcer arrived at the scene, and the
two ofﬁcers arrested Pierce for driving under suspension and failing to maintain
liability insurance.88
After placing Pierce in the back of the patrol car, the two ofﬁcers searched
the driver’s area of the vehicle’s interior.89 One of the ofﬁcers discovered syringes
and a vial of liquid methamphetamine in a partially open bag on the ﬂoor behind
the driver’s seat.90 The ofﬁcer then searched other containers in the vehicle and
found more drug paraphernalia, a list of names and phone numbers of individuals
involved in the drug trade, and a recipe for cooking methamphetamine.91 The
State charged Pierce with three drug-related offenses, and Pierce moved to suppress
the evidence on the grounds the search violated the search and seizure provisions
of both the United States and Wyoming Constitutions.92 The trial court denied
Pierce’s motion, and Pierce entered a conditional guilty plea reserving his right to
appeal.93

83

171 P.3d 525 (Wyo. 2007).

84

Id. at 527. The park is closed from midnight to 6 a.m.; this stop occurred just after 5 a.m.
Id. at 527 n.1.
85

Id.

86

Id.

87

Id. at 527–28.

88

0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 528. The arresting ofﬁcer testiﬁed that arrests for driving under suspension
are a common police practice in Casper. Id. at 528 n.2.
89

Id. at 528.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Id. at 528–29. The State charged Pierce with three crimes: (1) third, or subsequent
possession of powder or crystalline methamphetamine; (2) third, or subsequent, possession of liquid
methamphetamine; and (3) possession of more than .3 grams of methamphetamine. WYO. STAT.
ANN § 35-7-1031(c)(i)–(ii), (9) (LexisNexis 2007).
93

0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 529.
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On appeal, Pierce argued the district court erred in denying his motion
to suppress because the search of his vehicle was unreasonable, and therefore
violated the Wyoming Constitution’s search and seizure provision.94 The State
raised the search incident to arrest exception.95 The State argued the search was
reasonable because the scope of the search was limited to the area within the
driver’s immediate control just prior to the arrest.96 Chief Justice Voigt issued
the opinion of a divided court and held the vehicle search unreasonable and,
therefore, unconstitutional.97 The court recited the two policies that justify
searches incident to arrest—to prevent the arrestee from concealing or destroying
evidence, or to prevent the arrestee from reaching weapons.98 Next, the opinion
listed eleven factors that indicated the absence of either policy in the circumstances
presented.99 The court then distinguished 0IERCE from the small body of case law,
which unfailingly upheld warrantless searches, applying the search incident to
arrest exception under the Wyoming Constitution.100
Justices Hill and Burke each issued dissenting opinions.101 Justice Burke
criticized the court for not affording ofﬁcer safety concerns appropriate weight as a
factor in its reasonableness analysis.102 Every arrest presents ofﬁcer safety concerns
according to Justice Burke, and therefore, all searches conducted incident to arrest
are justiﬁed.103 Justice Burke found the search reasonable and consistent with
Wyoming precedent because the search’s scope was limited to the area within
the driver’s immediate control just prior to the arrest.104 Justice Burke further
94

Id. at 530 (citing WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 4).

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 531.

99

Id. at 531–32. The court considered eleven factors: (1) the apparent inﬂuence of alcohol
or drugs on the arrestee; (2) the likelihood the vehicle contained evidence of any crime; (3) the
pat-down search uncovered no evidence; (4) the State did not attempt to justify the search for
evidentiary reasons in its appellate brief; (5) the apparent presence of weapons in the vehicle, on
the person, or likely presence due to the nature of the crime; (6) the ratio of vehicle passengers to
ofﬁcers; (7) the isolation of the handcuffed arrestee in the back of the patrol car; (8) any suspicious or
furtive behavior by the arrestee; (9) the inherent dangerousness of the setting of the arrest including
time of day and location; (10) the interaction with the arrestee including information regarding
past criminal history; and (11) the cooperation of the arrestee during the arrest. Id. The 0IERCE
court indicated the questionable signiﬁcance of the eleven factors when it said, “[t]hat is not to say,
of course, that any of these considerations might not be viewed differently if it were to arise in the
context of different facts.” Id. at 532 (emphasis in original).
100
Id. at 532–35 (discussing #LARK, 138 P.3d 677; Cotton, 119 P.3d 931; and !NDREWS, 40 P.3d
708). #LARK and Cotton reappear in Holman. Holman, 183 P.3d at 373.
101

0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 536–38, 539.

102

Id. at 536–38 (Burke, J., dissenting).

103

Id. at 537 (Burke, J., dissenting) (citing Wash. v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982); Mich. v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979); Chimel v. Cal., 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969)).
104

Id. (Burke, J., dissenting).
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criticized the court for undermining standard law enforcement policy permitting
searches incident to arrest.105 The court expects ofﬁcers in the ﬁeld to determine
when a vehicle search is reasonable, and Justice Burke accused the majority of
failing to provide law enforcement with sufﬁcient guidance to make such a legal
distinction.106 Justice Hill’s brief dissent concurred with Justice Burke’s opinion,
and added a conclusory statement that the court misapplied 6ASQUEZ.107
Only four months after issuing 0IERCE V 3TATE, the Wyoming Supreme Court,
once again divided, reversed itself by ﬁnding a vehicle search reasonable in Sam
v. State.108 In this case, the balance of the court was inverted—Justice Hill wrote
the majority opinion, joined by Justices Burke and Kite.109 Chief Justice Voigt
and Justice Golden dissented.110 The story of Sam’s arrest and vehicle search began
when police in Cody, Wyoming received a complaint that Steven Ace Sam (“Sam”)
violated a protective order by calling and following a woman and her daughter.111
The ofﬁcer requested an arrest warrant, but before the warrant arrived, the ofﬁcer
observed Sam repeatedly drive past the Crisis Intervention Center where the
woman and her daughter went for help.112 The ofﬁcer stopped Sam, who drove
with a passenger, and arrested Sam for violating the protection order and driving
with a suspended license.113 In the pat-down search of Sam, the ofﬁcer discovered
two large bundles of cash in Sam’s pockets.114 After placing Sam in the back of
his patrol car, the ofﬁcer searched the interior of Sam’s vehicle incident to the
arrest.115
The search of the vehicle did not produce any evidence of the two crimes
for which Sam was arrested, but the search did uncover drug paraphernalia,
methamphetamine, and cocaine.116 The State charged Sam with possession
105

Id. (Burke, J., dissenting).

106

0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 537 (Burke, J., dissenting).

107

Id. at 538 (Hill, J., dissenting); compare supra notes 53–64 and accompanying text (reviewing
6ASQUEZ), WITH INFRA notes 161–66 and accompanying text (articulating a similar interpretation of
6ASQUEZ that appeared in Justice Burke’s dissenting opinion in Holman).
108

177 P.3d 1173 (Wyo. 2008).

109

Id.

110

Id. at 1178–80 (Voigt, C.J., dissenting).

111

Id. at 1175. Sam lived with the victim and her daughter for several years preceding the
dissolution of the relationship and subsequent domestic violence protective order. Id. Sam allegedly
violated the protective order by telephone harassment several times in the days preceding the arrest.
Id.
112

Id.

113

Sam, 177 P.3d at 1175.

114

Brief of Appellee at 5, Sam, 177 P.3d 1173 (No. 07-57) (May 14, 2007), 2007 WL 5187033.
Sam justiﬁed the large sum of money by alleging he just sold a car. Brief of Appellant at 4–5, Sam,
177 P.3d 1173 (No. 07-57) (Mar. 26, 2007), 2006 WL 5953239.
115

Brief of Appellee, Sam, supra note 114, at 5.

116

Sam, 177 P.3d at 1175–76.
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of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.117 Sam moved to suppress the
evidence of the drug charges, and the trial court denied his motion.118 Sam made a
conditional guilty plea reserving his right to challenge the constitutionality of the
search of his vehicle.119 A divided Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the district
court’s decision denying Sam’s motion to suppress.120
Writing for the majority, Justice Hill stated four situations remove a case from
the reasonable under all of the circumstances analysis: (1) to search for weapons or
contraband that pose a risk to ofﬁcer or public safety; (2) when the presence of a
passenger in the car poses a threat to ofﬁcer or public safety; (3) the need to secure
an arrestee’s automobile; and (4) to search for evidence related to the crime that
justiﬁed the arrest.121 The court focused on the evidentiary prong of its 6ASQUEZ
holding; the arresting ofﬁcer in 6ASQUEZ was justiﬁed to search for evidence of
intoxication because Vasquez was arrested for drunk driving.122 Reasoning by
analogy, the court held an arrest for violating a protection order justiﬁed a vehicle
search incident to arrest to ﬁnd evidence relating to that crime.123 A review of the
record indicated the arresting ofﬁcer searched the vehicle for evidence related to
the crime of violating a protection order: potential evidentiary items included
the cell phone Sam used to make harassing telephone calls and documents that
might indicate Sam’s intentions toward the individuals protected by the order.124
The court thereby found the warrantless vehicle search reasonable because the
search met the evidentiary prong of the reasonable under all of the circumstances
test.125
Chief Justice Voigt’s dissent accused the court of misapplying 6ASQUEZ.126
According to Chief Justice Voigt, the four exceptions to 6ASQUEZ cited by the court
are not exceptions at all, but merely factors to consider when evaluating whether
a search meets the reasonable under all of the circumstances test.127 Chief Justice
Voigt expressed concern that the court established a bright-line rule authorizing
a vehicle search incident to arrest per se, thereby nullifying the court’s reasonable

117

Id. at 1174.

118

Id.

119

Id.

120

Id. at 1173.

121

Sam, 177 P.3d at 1177.

122

Id. at 1178. In 6ASQUEZ, the court also justiﬁed the warrantless vehicle search for ofﬁcer safety
concerns evident by empty shell casings in the vehicle and the presence of additional passengers.
6ASQUEZ, 990 P.2d at 489; see supra notes 53–64 and accompanying text (reviewing 6ASQUEZ).
123

Sam, 177 P. 3d at 1178.

124

Id. at 1177.

125

Id. at 1178.

126

Id. at 1179 (Voigt, C.J., dissenting).

127

Id. (Voigt, C.J., dissenting).
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under all of the circumstances test.128 Chief Justice Voigt agreed with the court
that ofﬁcer safety or evidentiary concerns justify vehicle searches incident to arrest,
but found neither justiﬁcation supported by the facts of the case at bar.129
Chief Justice Voigt suggested either probable cause or reasonable suspicion
that the vehicle contains weapons or evidence of the alleged crime is required
to justify a warrantless vehicle search incident to arrest.130 The arresting ofﬁcer
testiﬁed at trial that he searched the vehicle incident to arrest—without asserting
any level of suspicion to justify the search.131 The State did not enunciate what
evidence the ofﬁcer searched for until the State ﬁled its appellate brief, and Chief
Justice Voigt found this post-hoc justiﬁcation for a search inadequate to meet
Wyoming’s reasonable under all of the circumstances requirement.132
0IERCE and Sam demonstrate a clear split in the Wyoming Supreme Court
regarding warrantless vehicle searches conducted under the search incident to
arrest exception.133 Justice Kite was the swing Justice in each opinion.134 With
the seemingly inapposite opinions from Sam and 0IERCE as the backdrop, the
Wyoming Supreme Court issued its third opinion in seven months concerning
warrantless vehicle searches incident to arrest in Holman.135

PRINCIPAL CASE
Holman asked the Wyoming Supreme Court to ﬁnd the warrantless search
of his vehicle unreasonable, and thereby unconstitutional, and reverse the trial
court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence.136 Holman argued the search
of his vehicle was unreasonable because the vehicle did not contain any evidence
of the crime for which he was arrested, and nothing in the record indicated the

128

Sam, 177 P. 3d at 1179 (Voigt, C.J., dissenting) (“Most troubling to me is the idea that the
arresting ofﬁcer may always search the vehicle for evidence of the crime for which the driver was
arrested. If that is the rule, then 6ASQUEZ has no meaning, and the vehicle may always be searched,
because an arrested driver has always been arrested for the alleged commission of some crime.”).
129

Id. at 1179–80 (Voigt, C.J., dissenting).

130

Id. at 1179 (Voigt, C.J., dissenting).

131

Id. (Voigt, C.J., dissenting).

132

Id. (Voigt, C.J., dissenting) (“Subsequent speculation does not make a search reasonable
under all of the circumstances.”).
133

Compare supra notes 83–107 and accompanying text (0IERCE majority comprised of Chief
Justice Voigt, and Justices Golden and Kite), WITH SUPRA notes 108–32 and accompanying text (Sam
majority comprised of Justices Hill, Burke, and Kite).
134

See supra note 133.

135

#OMPARE 0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 525 (issued November 15, 2007), and Sam, 177 P.3d at 1173
(issued March 16, 2008), and Holman, 183 P.3d at 368 (issued two months later on May 14,
2008).
136

Holman v. State, 183 P.3d 368, 371 (Wyo. 2008).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol9/iss1/6

14

Frederickson: Constitutional Law - Recent Developments in Wyoming's Reasonablen

CASE NOTE

2009

209

presence of any ofﬁcer safety issues.137 The State countered with ﬁve factors
supporting its conclusion that the search was reasonable under the search incident
to arrest exception: (1) the search addressed ofﬁcer and public safety concerns;
(2) the ofﬁcers needed to preserve evidence; (3) the search was limited in scope;
(4) automobile drivers have diminished expectations of privacy; and (5) the
ofﬁcers needed to secure the vehicle.138

-AJORITY /PINION
Chief Justice Voigt wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Golden, Kite,
and Hill.139 The court focused on the arresting ofﬁcer’s testimony that he searched
Holman’s vehicle incident to arrest as a matter of standard police procedure,
without articulating facts raising ofﬁcer safety or evidentiary concerns.140 The
court held an unadorned per se policy of searching vehicles incident to any arrest
might satisfy the Fourth Amendment, but does not satisfy Wyoming’s heightened
constitutional protections requiring its “reasonable under all of the circumstances”
analysis.141 The court narrowed the issue to whether two exceptions applied to
justify the search at bar: (1) the search incident to arrest exception, and (2) the
search of an automobile upon probable cause exception.142

137
Id. at 373. Holman also argued the search was not justiﬁed by reasonable suspicion as an
investigatory stop. See Brief of Appellant, Holman, supra note 2, at 4–10. One of the issues reviewed
in investigatory stops is whether the initial stop was justiﬁed by reasonable suspicion. Brown v. State,
944 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Wyo. 1997). Holman argued the facts of the case were inadequate to give
rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when the ofﬁcer initiated the stop because there
is nothing criminal about sitting in a car, using a monocular, or moving a car occasionally. Brief
of Appellant, Holman, supra note 2, at 4–10. The State countered that Holman’s furtive behavior
supported the existence of a reasonable suspicion that Holman engaged in indecent exposure or
masturbation while watching children. Brief of Appellee at 9–14, Holman, 183 P.3d 368 (No.
06-140) (Dec. 14, 2006), 2006 WL 5953240. The Holman court did not address these arguments
in its opinion. See Holman, 183 P.3d 368.
138

Brief of Appellee, Holman, supra note 137, at 17.

139

See Holman, 183 P.3d 368.

140

Id. at 372. The ofﬁcer stated this simple justiﬁcation for the warrantless vehicle search twice.
Id. At the preliminary hearing, the ofﬁcer stated he searched the vehicle incident to arrest because
“[t]hat’s what I always do.” Id. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the ofﬁcer told defense
counsel “[o]nce he’s arrested, I’m going to search the vehicle regardless of whether we’re going to
leave it parked there or move it to a different spot to be parked or tow it. . . . It doesn’t matter. I’m
going to search the vehicle.” Id.
141

Id. at 372–73. A lawful arrest justiﬁes a thorough search incident to that arrest in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 n.14 (1983) (“[T]he ‘bright
line’ that we drew in Belton clearly authorizes [an unlimited] search whenever ofﬁcers effect a
custodial arrest.”); see supra notes 36–44 and accompanying text (reviewing Belton).
142
Holman, 183 P.3d at 373. The State never raised the automobile exception. Brief of Appellant,
Holman, supra note 2, at i, 15–29; see infra notes 217–26 and accompanying text (demonstrating
the court’s sua sponte discussion of the automobile exception is the strongest fact supporting the
imposition of reasonable suspicion onto the search incident to arrest exception).
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The court reiterated the rule of the automobile exception: a warrantless
search of an automobile is permissible if probable cause exists to believe the
vehicle contains weapons or contraband.143 The court then compared the facts of
the present case to the facts of 6ASQUEZ and 0IERCE.144 The court re-characterized
its 6ASQUEZ decision as discussing the automobile exception; the automobile
exception applied because the probable cause necessary to justify an arrest for
drunk driving equated to the same probable cause justifying a search of the vehicle
for intoxicants related to that crime.145 In 0IERCE, the automobile exception did
not apply because of the improbability that evidence relating to the crime for
which Pierce was arrested (driving under suspension) remained in the vehicle.146
The court held that, analogous to 0IERCE, the automobile exception did not apply
to the present facts because there was no likelihood, and thereby no probable
cause, that evidence relating to the crime for which Holman was arrested (driving
under suspension) would be found in the vehicle.147
The court began its discussion of the search incident to arrest exception by
reciting the two policies that justify searches incident to arrest—to ensure ofﬁcer
safety where circumstances indicate the arrestee may have weapons, and to prevent
the destruction or concealment of evidence.148 Next, the court distinguished the
facts of the case from the facts of 6ASQUEZ, Cotton, and #LARK and concluded no
facts in the present case raised ofﬁcer safety concerns.149 The court recited, but
did not explicitly apply, eight of the eleven factors supporting its holding in
0IERCE that found a vehicle search incident to arrest unreasonable.150 The court
concluded that, analogous to 0IERCE, the record presented no objective facts to ﬁnd

143

Holman, 183 P.3d at 374–75.

144

Id. at 375–76.

145

Id. at 375; see supra notes 53–64 and accompanying text (reviewing 6ASQUEZ, which analyzed
the search incident to arrest exception).
146

Holman, 183 P.3d at 375 (quoting 0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 531). The 0IERCE court never addressed
the automobile exception. 0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 529 (“We are concerned in the instant appeal with the
applicability of the search-incident-to-arrest exception.”); see supra notes 83–107 and accompanying
text (reviewing 0IERCE).
147

Holman, 183 P.3d at 374–76.

148

Id. at 373.

149

Id. at 373–74; SEE 0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 532–35 (distinguishing 0IERCE from the small body of
precedent applying Wyoming’s unique search incident to arrest exception).
150
Holman, 183 P.3d at 374. The court considered these factors: (1) the apparent inﬂuence of
alcohol or drugs on the arrestee; (2) the apparent presence of weapons in the vehicle, on the person,
or likely presence due to the violent nature of the crime; (3) the ratio of vehicle passengers to ofﬁcers;
(4) the isolation of the handcuffed arrestee in the back of the patrol car; (5) any suspicious or furtive
behavior by the arrestee; (6) the inherent dangerousness of the setting of the arrest including time
of day and location; (7) the interaction with the arrestee including information regarding past
criminal history; (8) the cooperation of the arrestee during the arrest. Id.; see infra notes 230–85 and
accompanying text (analyzing the 0IERCE and Holman factors).
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either ofﬁcer safety or other exigent circumstances justiﬁed the search of Holman’s
vehicle incident to his arrest.151
The court expressly rejected three factors the State argued weighed in favor
of ﬁnding the warrantless vehicle search reasonable.152 First, the court found the
limited scope of the vehicle search immaterial.153 According to the court, if probable
cause existed to support the vehicle search, then the automobile exception applied
and the search could have encompassed any part of the vehicle and its contents.154
Second, the court recognized a diminished expectation of privacy in automobiles,
but held the search invaded Holman’s remaining privacy interest because the
ofﬁcers lacked probable cause and no evidence of ofﬁcer safety concerns existed.155
Third, the court was not persuaded by a need to secure the vehicle.156 The court
agreed the police should not abandon a car containing weapons or contraband in
a city park, and if the police had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained
such items, then a warrantless vehicle search would be reasonable under the
automobile exception.157

#ONCURRING /PINION
Justice Hill wrote a short concurrence to distinguish the present case from
0IERCE and Sam.158 After carefully reiterating the standard of review and the need
for ad hoc review in search and seizure cases, Justice Hill held the circumstances
of this case inadequate to satisfy the court’s reasonableness requirement.159 Justice
Hill stated a stop, search, and seizure based on a mere hunch is unreasonable and,
therefore, unconstitutional.160

$ISSENTING /PINION
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Burke found the majority in the present
case and its companion case, 0IERCE, inconsistent with Wyoming precedent,
151

Holman, 183 P.3d at 374.

152

Id. at 376–77.

153

Id. at 376 (“The limited nature of the scope of the search in this case does not justify the
otherwise impermissible search.”).
154

Id. (citing Vassar v. State, 99 P.3d 987, 986 (Wyo. 2004)).

155

Id.

156

Holman, 183 P.3d at 376–77.

157

Id. at 377.

158

Id. (Hill, J., concurring).

159

Id. (Hill, J., concurring). The standard of review is two-fold: the reviewing court will not
disturb factual ﬁndings unless clearly erroneous, and the issue of law (whether an unreasonable
search and seizure occurred and thereby violated the Wyoming Constitution) is reviewed de novo.
Id. at 377 (Hill, J., concurring).
160

Id. (Hill, J., concurring).
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which authorizes a limited search of the area in the arrestee’s immediate control
incident to any arrest.161 Justice Burke began by reviewing the foundation for
the reasonable under all of the circumstances approach established in 6ASQUEZ.162
According to Justice Burke, while 6ASQUEZ established a broad rule that all searches
must be reasonable, the 6ASQUEZ holding was actually quite narrow because it only
determined whether the scope of the search incident to arrest exception included
closed or locked containers inside a vehicle.163 Wyoming joined a minority of states
that re-evaluated state constitutional provisions and eschewed Belton by holding
vehicle searches incident to arrest do not per se permit opening containers.164
Justice Burke explained that in 6ASQUEZ, the court determined the permissibility of
thorough vehicle searches.165 According to Justice Burke, the narrow 6ASQUEZ rule
did not apply to the present case because the disputed search was limited to the
area in the arrestee’s immediate control.166
Justice Burke accused the court of muddling three exceptions to the warrant
requirement: the automobile exception, the search incident to arrest exception,
and the investigatory detention exception.167 According to Justice Burke, the
automobile exception (search and/or seizure of an automobile upon probable
cause) explicitly requires probable cause.168 By contrast, Justice Burke stated the
search incident to arrest exception (search of an arrested suspect and the area
within his control) does not explicitly require any justiﬁcation beyond the arrest
itself.169 Justice Burke argued a lawful arrest supported by probable cause provides
the same probable cause to uphold a search incident to that arrest.170 Justice Burke
also claimed the court misapplied the standard of reasonable suspicion which,
he claimed, is a level of suspicion relevant only to the investigatory detention
exception.171
Justice Burke further criticized the court for ﬁnding the crime for which the
appellant was arrested a signiﬁcant factor in its reasonableness analysis.172 If the
161

Holman, 183 P.3d at 378 (Burke, J., dissenting).

162

Id. (Burke, J., dissenting).

163

Id. (Burke, J., dissenting) (discussing 6ASQUEZ, 990 P.2d at 488–89).

164

Id. (Burke, J., dissenting).

165

Id. (Burke, J., dissenting).

166

Holman, 183 P.3d at 378 (Burke, J., dissenting). Justice Burke stated the 6ASQUEZ holding
was appropriately applied in #LARK, when the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld a warrantless vehicle
search, including the opening of a sealed box, due to ofﬁcer safety concerns. Id. (discussing Clark v.
State, 138 P.3d 677 (Wyo. 2006)).
167

Id. at 379–82 (Burke, J., dissenting).

168

Id. at 379 (Burke, J., dissenting) (citing Vassar, 99 P.3d at 996).

169

Id. (Burke, J., dissenting).

170

Id. (Burke, J., dissenting).

171

Holman, 183 P.3d at 382 (Burke, J., dissenting).

172

Id. at 380 (Burke, J., dissenting).
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nature of the crime indicates whether ofﬁcer safety concerns exist, then, according
to Justice Burke, the court failed to inform law enforcement which crimes and
related arrests are inherently dangerous.173 Justice Burke advised the court to
follow federal precedent which treats every arrest as dangerous.174

ANALYSIS
The Wyoming Supreme Court stepped away from its search incident to arrest
precedent in 0IERCE, and conﬁrmed its new direction in Holman.175 Regrettably,
throughout the Holman triumvirate, the court failed to synthesize its new
direction into a distinct set of rules for legal practitioners and law enforcement
to apply.176 The analysis section of this case note determines that in the search
incident to arrest exception, the court deﬁnes “reasonable under all of the
circumstances” as reasonable grounds.177 The appropriate standard to be applied
is reasonable suspicion.178 The factors the Wyoming Supreme Court analyzes in
search incident to arrest cases support this theory and provide practical guidance
for law enforcement and practitioners.179 These factors incidentally demonstrate
continuity in Wyoming’s search incident to arrest cases, and reconcile the
anomalous case in the Holman triumvirate, Sam, with its companions.180
As a preliminary matter, a fundamental error in the court’s opinion needs
clariﬁcation.181 The court stated no search was permissible incident to arrest.182
At a minimum, a limited pat-down search of the arrestee’s person for weapons or
evidence was permitted: it was a factor considered by the court in its analysis.183

173

Id. (Burke, J., dissenting).

174

Id. at 380–81 (Burke, J., dissenting) (citing Wash. v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982)).

175

Compare supra notes 53–82 and accompanying text (reviewing search incident to arrest
decisions on independent state grounds preceding 0IERCE which unfailingly upheld warrantless
vehicle searches), WITH SUPRA notes 83–171 and accompanying text (reviewing the triumvirate of
0IERCE, Sam, and Holman).
176

See infra notes 181–94 and accompanying text.

177

See infra notes 188–94 and accompanying text.

178

See infra notes 201–29 and accompanying text.

179

See infra notes 230–85 and accompanying text.

180

See infra notes 250–85 and accompanying text.

181

Holman, 183 P.3d at 380 (Burke, J., dissenting) (“Fundamentally, [the court] fails to
acknowledge the distinction between the authority to conduct a search incident to arrest, and the
proper scope of that search.”).
182
Id. at 376 (“The limited nature of the scope of the search in this case does not justify the
otherwise impermissible search.”).
183

Id. at 374 (“The . . . ‘pat down’ search of the appellant’s person did not uncover anything
of evidentiary value.”).
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Furthermore, the permissible search of an arrestee’s person is the well-recognized
foundation of the search incident to arrest exception.184 The scope of a search
made incident to arrest—beyond the person, to the interior of a vehicle—is the
focus of the Holman opinion.185 Every case in Wyoming’s small body of case
law interpreting its search incident to arrest exception focuses on the scope of
the search.186 The Holman court made a careless error in Holman by failing to
distinguish between the permissible search of a person incident to arrest and the
extension of that search to the interior of a vehicle.187
In the Holman triumvirate of cases, the Wyoming Supreme Court replaced its
vague “reasonable under all of the circumstances” requirement with a “reasonable
basis” standard.188 A vehicle search incident to arrest is unconstitutional unless
a reasonable basis—either probable cause or reasonable suspicion—suggests the
vehicle contains weapons or evidence.189 In the ﬁrst case of the triumvirate, 0IERCE,
Chief Justice Voigt stated “we must be able to ﬁnd a reasonable basis, articulable
from the totality of the circumstances in each case, to justify a search.”190 In the
second case, Sam, Chief Justice Voigt dissented because “[t]he ofﬁcer did not claim
to have probable cause to search the vehicle, nor did he claim to have reasonable

184
Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); Chimel v. Cal., 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969);
U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). See generally 1 LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 1.1(a)–(c)
(discussing the history of the Fourth Amendment).

See WILLIAM W. GREENHALGH, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 13 (2003). There are
two issues under each exception to the warrant requirement: (1) identifying the predicate for the
search, and (2) deﬁning the permissible scope of that search. Id. The predicate under the search
incident to arrest exception is the occurrence of a lawful arrest. Id. The most common dispute in
search incident cases is the second issue—deﬁning the permissible scope of the search. Id.; see also
2OBINSON, 414 U.S. at 224 (explaining the search incident to arrest exception involves two searches:
the search of the person and the search within the area of the arrestee’s immediate control).
185

186
See supra notes 53–132 and accompanying text (reviewing the small body of case law
applying the search incident to arrest exception under the Wyoming Constitution). In !NDREWS,
the court determined whether a wallet on a counter next to the arrestee lay within the permissible
scope of a search. Andrews v. State, 40 P.3d 708, 715 (Wyo. 2002). In Cotton, the court considered
whether the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest included the pocket of a shirt inside a
vehicle. Cotton v. State, 119 P.3d 931, 933 (Wyo. 2005). In #LARK, the court investigated whether
the scope of a search incident to arrest included a sealed box behind the driver’s seat inside the
vehicle. Clark v. State, 138 P.3d 677, 680 (Wyo. 2006). The 0IERCE opinion clearly articulated
the issue as whether extending the scope of a search incident to arrest to the interior of a vehicle
violated the state constitution. Pierce v. State, 117 P.3d 525, 529 (Wyo. 2007). The Sam court also
articulated the difference between the search of the person incident to arrest and the extension of
that search to the interior of a vehicle. Sam v. State, 177 P.3d 1173, 1178 (Wyo. 2008).

Holman, 183 P.3d at 380 (Burke, J., dissenting); see also GREENHALGH, supra note 185, at 13
(explaining the common dispute in search incident to arrest cases concerns the scope of the search
beyond the arrestee’s person).
187

188

See infra notes 189–229 and accompanying text.

189

See infra notes 190–198 and accompanying text.

190

0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 532 (emphasis added).
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suspicion of anything when he searched it.”191 Writing for the majority again in
Holman, Chief Justice Voigt remained silent on whether any level of reasonable
grounds were required to justify the warrantless vehicle search.192 Justice Burke
ﬁlled that silence by criticizing the Holman court for imposing both reasonable
suspicion and probable cause onto the search incident to arrest exception.193
The court never speciﬁed which level of suspicion is required.194 The Wyoming
Supreme Court deﬁnes reasonable suspicion as “‘a particularized and objective
basis’ for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.”195 The
court recognizes the higher standard of probable cause “where the known facts and
circumstances are sufﬁcient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.”196 Reasonable suspicion is
the less demanding standard; it requires more than a mere suspicion or hunch but
requires less than probable cause.197 Reasonable suspicion is the only logical level
of suspicion to apply to the search incident to arrest exception.198
As a threshold matter, it is helpful to recall the Wyoming Supreme Court
recognizes two categories inside the search incident to arrest exception—the
evidentiary prong and the ofﬁcer safety prong.199 The level of suspicion required

191

Sam, 177 P.3d at 1179 (Voigt, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

192

Holman, 183 P.3d 368.

193

Id. at 380 (Burke, J., dissenting) (“[The court] borrows the probable cause requirement
from automobile searches, and the reasonable suspicion requirement from investigatory detention
cases, and imposes them as new requirements for searches incident to arrest.”).
194

See supra notes 188–93 and accompanying text (explaining that either reasonable suspicion
or probable cause must justify a warrantless search).
195

Speten v. State, 185 P.3d 25, 28 (Wyo. 2008) (citing Damato v. State, 64 P.3d 700, 707
(Wyo. 2003)).
196

Id. The two concepts of probable cause and reasonable suspicion are objective standards
unavailable as a neat set of legal rules; the standards take into account the ordinary human
experience, and require fact speciﬁc inquiries in each context in which the standards are applied.
68 AM. JUR. 2D 3EARCHES AND 3EIZURES § 122 (2000). Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1007 (8th
ed. 2005) (“[P]robable cause: a reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is
committing a crime or that a place contains speciﬁc items connected with a crime.”), WITH BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1212 (“[R]easonable suspicion: a particularized and objective basis, supported by
speciﬁc and articulable facts, for suspecting a person of criminal activity.”).
197
Damato, 64 P.3d at 707 (quoting U.S. v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 1997)); see also
68 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 196, § 88 (explaining the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion is a
minimal level of justiﬁcation and requires only a fair probability contraband or evidence will be
found).
198

See infra notes 201–29 and accompanying text. Contra Decock & Mercer, supra note 28,
at 164–66 (advocating for the adoption of probable cause to the evidentiary prong of Wyoming’s
search incident to arrest exception).
199

6ASQUEZ, 990 P.2d at 489 (citations omitted). In the evidentiary prong, the court further
recognizes two subcategories—gathering evidence or preventing the destruction of evidence. Id.
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under each prong is reasonable suspicion, but the reasoning for this prerequisite
differs under each prong; each is thereby analyzed separately.200

2EASONABLE 3USPICION 5NDER THE /FlCER 3AFETY 0RONG
The reasonable basis to justify a warrantless vehicle search under the ofﬁcer
safety prong is reasonable suspicion.201 Justice Burke correctly stated in his Holman
dissent the court imported reasonable suspicion from its investigatory detention
jurisprudence.202 The court’s import, however, was not inappropriate because
ofﬁcer safety is the common denominator for searches in both search incident to
arrest and investigatory detention cases.203 Moreover, Wyoming recognizes that
law enforcement faces serious safety risks in the line of duty.204
Ofﬁcer safety concerns were addressed by the United States Supreme Court
in 4ERRY V /HIO—the foundation of the investigatory detention exception in
Federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.205 The Terry Court stated it would be
unreasonable to force law enforcement to take unnecessary safety risks when an
ofﬁcer suspects a person in close proximity possesses a weapon; therefore, pat-down
searches, while invasive of citizens’ protected privacy interests, are permissible
during investigatory detentions.206 The Court adopted reasonable suspicion as
the basis to justify searches conducted in the interest of ofﬁcer safety.207 The Terry

200
See infra notes 201–16 and accompanying text (discussing the ofﬁcer safety prong), and
infra notes 217–29 and accompanying text (discussing the evidentiary prong).
201
O’Boyle v. State, 117 P.3d 401, 409 (Wyo. 2005) (discussing Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 489).
The 0IERCE majority cited the same conclusion from /"OYLE. 0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 531.
202

Holman, 183 P.3d at 381–82 (Burke, J., dissenting).

203

Speten, 185 P.3d at 32 n.6, 33 (Wyo. 2008). Ofﬁcer safety concerns based on less than
probable cause also appear in the automatic companion rule. Id. at 31 (citing Cotton, 119 P.3d 931,
936).
204

Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Mickelson v. State, 906 P.2d
1020, 1023 (Wyo. 1995)).
205

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1968). The Terry decision is a seminal case for multiple
issues, not just the investigatory detention exception, and has been subject to extensive commentary.
See generally Michael Mello, 3TOP Terry v. Ohio Step-by-Step, as an Illustration of Fourth Amendment
!NALYSIS OR 7HAT $ID $ETECTIVE -ARTIN -C&ADDEN +NOW AND 7HEN $ID (E +NOW )T , 44 NO. 4
CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (2008) (discussing issues of reasonable suspicion, seizures, frisks, and race in the
1968 decision); Gregory Howard Williams, 4HE 3UPREME #OURT AND "ROKEN 0ROMISES 4HE 'RADUAL
BUT #ONTINUAL %ROSION OF Terry v. Ohio, 34 HOW. L.J. 567, 570–76 (1991) (reviewing issues of the
reasonable suspicion standard, police power, and individual privacy rights in Terry).
206

Terry, 392 U.S. at 23–24.

207

Id. at 27 (“The ofﬁcer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue
is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his
safety or that of others was in danger. And in determining whether the ofﬁcer acted reasonably in
such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion
or ‘hunch,’ but to the speciﬁc reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience.”). While this standard bears striking similarities to the deﬁnition of probable
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Court supported its holding by citing alarming national statistics regarding ofﬁcer
fatalities and injuries suffered by concealed weapons.208 In -ICHIGAN V ,ONG, the
Court extended the permissive pat-down search to the interior of automobiles
during investigatory detentions so long as the ofﬁcer has reasonable suspicion the
suspect poses a threat, because vehicles may contain weapons easily accessible to
suspects.209 The same principle of preserving ofﬁcer safety further authorizes the
limited protective sweep inside homes during in-home arrests as long as ofﬁcers
have a reasonable suspicion that armed individuals exist inside the home during
the arrest.210
The Wyoming Supreme Court recognizes that ofﬁcer safety risks escalated
exponentially in the years since Terry, and accepts that police ofﬁcers may
reasonably invade citizens’ privacy interests to effectuate ofﬁcer safety.211 The
Wyoming Supreme Court suggested reasonable suspicion justiﬁed limited
searches in the interest of ofﬁcer safety in /"OYLE V 3TATE—the foundation of the
investigatory detention exception in Wyoming’s contemporary search and seizure
jurisprudence.212 The /"OYLE decision, issued in 2005, is one of the earliest
decisions applying Wyoming’s reasonable under all of the circumstances test.213
In reviewing the reasonable under all of the circumstances test, the /"OYLE court
concluded the 6ASQUEZ search met the test because the ofﬁcers had a reasonable

cause, commentators and courts concede Terry imposed the lower standard of reasonable suspicion
to justify limited pat-down searches for weapons in the interest of ofﬁcer safety. 4 LAFAVE, supra note
34, § 9.5(a); see also John Q. Barrett, $ECIDING THE 3TOP AND &RISK #ASES ! ,OOK )NSIDE THE 3UPREME
Court’s Conference, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 749, 784–93, 794, passim (1998) (detailing the shift from
probable cause at Terry’s conference discussions to the sliding scale of reasonable suspicion in the
ﬁnal opinion).
208

Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.

209

463 U.S. 1032, 1049–50 (1983).

210

Marilyn v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990). A limited search inside closets and spaces
immediately adjoining the area where the arrest occurs is per se permissible, but searches beyond
that area require reasonable suspicion. Id.
211

-ICKELSON, 906 P.2d at 1023; see also Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 637–38 (Wyo. 2000)
(ﬁnding the lateness of the hour, the history of burglaries in the area, and the nature of the suspected
crime of auto burglary created reasonable suspicion pursuant to Terry and justiﬁed the pat-down
search of a suspect during an investigatory detention in the interest of ofﬁcer safety).
212

117 P.3d 401, 409 (Wyo. 2005).

213

Id. (“Since 6ASQUEZ, we have not had the opportunity to consider a search and seizure claim
brought under article 1, § 4 . . . [because], the issue was not raised at all, or the party raising the
issue failed to provide cogent argument or properly present the question in the trial court, or we
simply declined to address the state constitutional claim and decided the case on other grounds.”).
The other early case applying the test was Almada v. State. 994 P.2d 299 (Wyo. 1999) (applying
the reasonable under all of the circumstances test to wiretap evidence). See generally Mervin
Mecklenberg, Comment, Fixing O’Boyle v. State—4RAFlC $ETENTIONS 5NDER 7YOMINGS %MERGING
3EARCH AND 3EIZURE 3TANDARD, 7 WYO. L. REV. 69 (2007) (reviewing Wyoming’s application of its
young reasonable under all of the circumstances test to the investigatory detention disputed in
/"OYLE).
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suspicion one of the vehicle’s occupants was armed.214 In 0IERCE, the ﬁrst case of the
Holman triumvirate, the court also recognized this conclusion regarding 6ASQUEZ
and the ofﬁcer safety prong: the ofﬁcers in 6ASQUEZ had a reasonable suspicion the
vehicle’s occupants were armed and therefore the search in 6ASQUEZ satisﬁed the
test.215 Clearly, reasonable suspicion satisﬁes the ofﬁcer safety prong of the search
incident to arrest exception.216

2EASONABLE 3USPICION 5NDER THE %VIDENTIARY 0RONG
The reasonable basis to justify a warrantless vehicle search under the evidentiary
prong of the exception is also reasonable suspicion: applying the greater standard
of probable cause triggers the automobile exception.217 The Holman court raised
the automobile exception on its own accord—the State and the appellant only
discussed the search incident to arrest and investigatory detention exceptions.218
The automobile exception justiﬁes a warrantless search of an automobile if probable
cause exists that the vehicle contains weapons or contraband.219 This exception is
supported by the inherent mobility of the vehicle and the diminished expectation
of privacy in the use and regulation of the vehicle.220 The Holman court went out
of its way to explain that if an ofﬁcer had probable cause to believe the vehicle
contained weapons or contraband, the State may raise the automobile exception,
and thereby leave the search incident to arrest exception superﬂuous.221
214
/"OYLE, 117 P.3d at 409 (“In 6ASQUEZ . . . [the search] WAS REASONABLE UNDER ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES
IN THAT LAW ENFORCEMENT HAD A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT ONE OF THE OCCUPANTS WAS ARMED.”) (emphasis
in original).
215

0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 531 (reviewing 6ASQUEZ and /"OYLE). The court recently emphasized that
ofﬁcer safety is not its own independent exception nor do ofﬁcer safety concerns create an automatic
right to search a suspect; the search must occur in conjunction with a lawful arrest in the search
incident to arrest exception, or in conjunction with an investigatory detention that is supported by
reasonable suspicion. Speten, 185 P.3d at 33.
216

See supra notes 201–15 and accompanying text.

217

See Holman, 183 P.3d at 376.

218

Brief of Appellant, Holman, supra note 2, at 4–14; Brief of Appellee, Holman, supra note
137, at 8–29.
219
%G, McKenney v. State, 165 P.3d 96, 99 (Wyo. 2007). This exception emerged in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). Wyoming recognizes the
same exception under its state constitution. Speten, 185 P.3d 30 (listing the automobile exception as
one of the commonly recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement); Nielson v. State, 599 P.2d
1326, 1330 (Wyo. 1979) (exploring the development of the automobile exception); State v. Kelly,
268 P. 571, 572 (Wyo. 1928) (“[T]he court should in all cases be satisﬁed, before permitting the use
of such evidence, that the searching ofﬁcer had in fact probable cause for his search.”).
220

Nielson, 599 P.2d at 1330–34. Vehicles may move out of the area or jurisdiction before an
ofﬁcial warrant issues, thereby making the warrant requirement impractical. Id. (discussing Carroll,
267 U.S. at 153–56). Wyoming also recognizes the diminished expectation of privacy articulated
in federal precedent. Id.
221
Holman, 183 P.3d at 374–77. Where an arrest involves an automobile, either the automobile
exception or the search incident to arrest exception might trigger. Id. at 379 (Burke, J., dissenting)
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The dissenting opinion in Sam further supports a requirement of reasonable
suspicion.222 Chief Justice Voigt (who wrote for the court in Holman and 0IERCE)
criticized the ofﬁcer in Sam several times for not having a reasonable suspicion
the vehicle contained evidence.223 By focusing on the ofﬁcer’s lack of reasonable
suspicion with respect to evidence in the vehicle, as opposed to the lack of
probable cause, Chief Justice Voigt clearly indicated reasonable suspicion meets
the evidentiary prong of the court’s reasonable under all of the circumstance
requirement.224 Furthermore, as in the Holman opinion, Chief Justice Voigt
distinguished the automobile exception, which requires probable cause, from
the search incident to arrest exception.225 As stated above, where probable cause
exists that the vehicle contains weapons or contraband, the automobile exception
justiﬁes a warrantless search of the vehicle, and the search incident to arrest
exception is rendered superﬂuous.226
One ﬁnal point supporting the import of reasonable suspicion to the
evidentiary prong of the search incident to arrest exception is Justice Hill’s
concurring opinion in Holman.227 Justice Hill used the language of the reasonable
suspicion standard when he found the search of Holman’s vehicle “prompted
more by suspicions or hunches than by concrete fact.”228 Reasonable suspicion
requires only something more than hunches or inchoate suspicions, and Justice
Hill, by his choice of language, explicitly requires the same.229

2EASONABLE 5NDER 3OME OF THE #IRCUMSTANCES
The Wyoming Supreme Court only takes into account factors supporting a
ﬁnding of reasonable suspicion under either prong (ofﬁcer safety or evidentiary)
of the search incident to arrest exception.230 Factors supporting probable cause
are excluded from a search incident to arrest analysis.231 In its ﬁrst decision in
(“These are separate and distinct exceptions to the prohibition against warrantless searches, and
the two should not be confused.”). Practitioners should distinguish between exceptions justifying
warrantless searches because the Wyoming Supreme Court recently admonished counsel for
presenting confusing arguments. Speten, 185 P.3d at 32–33, n.6.
222

See Sam, 177 P.3d at 1179 (Voigt, C.J., dissenting).

223

Id. (Voigt, C.J., dissenting).

224

Id. (Voigt, C.J., dissenting).

225

Id. (Voigt, C.J., dissenting).

226

See supra notes 143–47, 154–57, 219–21 and accompanying text (reviewing the automobile
exception).
227

See Holman, 183 P.3d at 378 (Hill, J., concurring).

228

Id. (Hill, J., concurring).

229

See supra notes 195–98 and accompanying text (analyzing the deﬁnition of reasonable
suspicion).
230

See infra notes 235–85 and accompanying text.

231

See infra notes 235–49 and accompanying text.
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the triumvirate, 0IERCE, the court listed eleven factors, eight of which the court
repeated in its Holman opinion.232 The Holman court also rejected several
factors as irrelevant to the search incident to arrest exception.233 The Holman
decision modiﬁes Wyoming’s semantically inaccurate “reasonable under all of the
circumstances” test, and suggests the development of a factor test.234
At least three circumstances are not considered in the reasonable under all
of the circumstances test applied to the search incident to arrest exception: the
expectation of privacy in an automobile, the limited scope of a search to the
driver’s area of a vehicle’s interior, and the need to secure a vehicle.235 The State
in Holman presented all three of these factors to support its conclusion the search
was reasonable under all of the circumstances.236 The court plainly dismissed
all three factors.237 This is remarkable because the Wyoming Supreme Court in
6ASQUEZ included two of these factors in its search incident to arrest analysis: the
diminished expectation of privacy and the need to secure a vehicle abandoned
after an arrest.238
The Holman court’s discussion of the need to secure the abandoned vehicle
strongly supports the import of reasonable suspicion to the search incident to
arrest exception.239 Responsible law enforcement cannot abandon an automobile
in a public place, like the park in Holman, with drugs plainly visible on the center
console.240 However, if the ofﬁcers knew drugs were in the car, the ofﬁcers would
have probable cause.241 As stated above, once probable cause exists, the automobile
exception applies instead of the search incident to arrest exception.242
The same reasoning applies to the factor of the diminished expectation of
privacy.243 It is well held that the expectation of privacy applies to the automobile
232

#OMPARE 0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 531–32 (listing eleven factors the court found relevant), WITH
Holman, 183 P.3d at 374 (repeating eight of the eleven factors from 0IERCE).
233

Holman, 183 P.3d at 376–77.

234

See infra notes 230–85 and accompanying text (analyzing factors considered in search
incident to arrest cases). See generally MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND
STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING 285–309 (2008) (exploring the psychological need for order
that leads legal practitioners to develop factor tests and how such tests can be used effectively in
persuasive writing).
235

Holman, 183 P.3d at 376–77.

236

Brief of Appellee, Holman, supra note 137, at 17–24.

237

Holman, 183 P.3d at 376.

238

6ASQUEZ, 990 P.2d at 489.

239

See Holman, 183 P.3d at 377.

240

Id.

241

Id.

242

Id.; see supra notes 217–26 and accompanying text.

243

See Holman, 183 P.3d at 376.
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exception.244 The import of this factor is inappropriate to the search incident to
arrest analysis because Wyoming recognizes some privacy interests in vehicles.245
Furthermore, the diminished expectation of privacy is criticized for affording too
many invasions of Fourth Amendment rights.246 The Wyoming Constitution
affords greater protection than the Fourth Amendment, so it makes sense to exile
the diminished expectation of privacy to the exception in which it was born,
thereby protecting the recognized privacy interests in automobiles.247
The other factor the Holman court dismissed was the limited scope of the
search to the driver’s area of the vehicle.248 The Holman court reasoned that the
limited scope of a search fails to resolve whether the search was justiﬁed in the
ﬁrst place, and is therefore an immaterial factor at this point in the analysis:
determining whether a warrantless vehicle search is in the permissible scope of a
search incident to arrest.249

Some of the Circumstances
When evaluating the search incident to arrest exception, the Wyoming
Supreme Court only considers factors supporting reasonable suspicion to meet
its reasonable under all of the circumstances test.250 The court considers at least
these factors: (1) the nature of the crime; (2) facts arising out of the arrest;
(3) apparent intoxication of the suspect; (4) the ratio of suspects to ofﬁcers; (5)
the physical ability of the suspect to reach weapons or evidence; (6) the suspect’s
behavior during the encounter and arrest; and (7) the time of day and location
of the arrest.251 This factor test provides continuity through Wyoming’s small

See generally 3 WAYNE LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 7.2(b) (explaining the development and
difﬁculties of the expectation of privacy in the automobile exception).
244

Holman, 183 P.3d at 376 (quoting 1 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 18.4
(3d ed. 2000)).
245

246

See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, !UTOMOBILE 3EARCHES AND $IMINISHED %XPECTATIONS IN THE 7ARRANT
Clause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 557, 569–72 (1982) (offering a four-part criticism of the diminished
expectation of privacy doctrine which subverts the practical application of the Fourth Amendment);
Vivian D. Wilson, 4HE 7ARRANTLESS !UTOMOBILE 3EARCH %XCEPTION 7ITHOUT *USTIlCATION, 32 HASTINGS
L.J. 127, 158 (1980) (criticizing the diminished expectation of privacy doctrine as unrealistic
in light of the pragmatic storage use characteristics of automobiles and advocating for increased
warrant requirements to protect individual privacy interests).
247

Cf. /"OYLE, 117 P.3d at 411 (“While we acknowledge the importance of drug interdiction,
we are deeply concerned by the resulting intrusion upon the privacy rights of Wyoming citizens.”).
248

Holman, 183 P.3d at 376.

249

Id.; see supra notes 181–87 (explaining the Holman decision applies to the scope of a search
incident to arrest despite the court’s careless statement that no search was permissible).
250

See infra notes 250–85 and accompanying text.

251

See infra notes 253–85 and accompanying text (evaluating each factor brieﬂy). The Holman
and 0IERCE courts also considered the point at which the State articulated circumstances that justify
the warrantless vehicle search. 0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 531; Holman, 183 P.3d at 374. This factor is
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body of search incident to arrest cases; reconciles the Sam decision with its
companions, 0IERCE and Holman; and provides some guidance to law enforcement
and practitioners in search incident to arrest cases.252
The ﬁrst factor is the relationship between the nature of the offense and
the likelihood of danger or evidentiary concerns.253 The nature of the crime has
been relevant to establishing reasonable suspicion since 4ERRY V /HIO.254 In Terry,
the United States Supreme Court found the nature of the suspected crime (a
robbery) a relevant factor in establishing reasonable suspicion the appellant was
armed, because robbery often involves the use of weapons.255 The Wyoming
Supreme Court similarly considered the nature of the offense in 6ASQUEZ: an
arrest for driving while intoxicated supports a level of suspicion that the vehicle
contains evidence of intoxication.256 Likewise, in !NDREWS, the suspect could easily
conceal in his wallet the coins and credit cards stolen in the alleged burglary.257
This factor weighed in favor of ﬁnding reasonable suspicion in Sam because the
suspect violated a domestic violence protective order concurrent to his arrest; this
factor helps resolve Sam’s incongruous position in the Holman triumvirate.258 By
contrast, this factor weighed against a ﬁnding of reasonable suspicion in Holman
because, as Holman suggested in his appellate brief, there is nothing criminal or
suspicious about sitting in a car watching ball games.259 The holdings of Holman
and 0IERCE make clear that an arrest for driving under suspension does not, by
itself, justify a warrantless search incident to arrest.260

merely a procedural matter: the court dismisses issues raised for the ﬁrst time in the appellate court.
Duke v. State, 99 P.3d 928, 959 (Wyo. 2004). Furthermore, law enforcement actions must be
objectively justiﬁed at the search’s inception. Mickelson v. State, 886 P.2d 247, 250 (Wyo. 1994),
aff ’d 906 P.2d 1020, 1025 (Wyo. 1995) (holding an ofﬁcer entering a building without a warrant
must have developed reasonable suspicion prior to entering according to statute); Wilson v. State,
874 P.2d 215, 225 (Wyo. 1994) (holding reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior must exist prior
to initiating an investigatory stop).
252

See infra notes 253–85 and accompanying text.
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0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 531. This factor is enumerated in 0IERCE, but does not appear in Holman.
Compare id., WITH (OLMAN, 183 P.3d at 374. Justice Burke nevertheless accused the Holman court of
inappropriately applying this factor. Holman, 183 P.3d at 380 (Burke, J., dissenting).
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392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968).
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Id. at 27–28.
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Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 489 (Wyo. 1999); Sam v. State, 177 P.3d 1173, 1178
(discussing 6ASQUEZ).
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!NDREWS, 40 P.3d at 715.

258

Sam, 177 P.3d at 1178 (acknowledging the ofﬁcer searched the arrestee’s vehicle for a cell
phone, writings, and instrumentalities that might evidence Sam’s intentions towards, or be used to
hurt, the protected individuals).
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Brief of Appellant, Holman, supra note 2, at 10.

260

3EE 0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 531; Holman, 183 P.3d at 377.
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Reasonable suspicion of ofﬁcer safety or evidentiary matters can also arise from
facts discovered during the course of the arrest.261 One source of facts discovered
during the arrest arises from the search of the person, which is per se permissible
incident to an arrest.262 The court considers whether the pat-down search of an
arrestee reveals evidence of any crime.263 This factor appeared in Sam, although
not discussed in the opinion, and helps to reconcile the three cases of the Holman
triumvirate: the ofﬁcer in Sam found large rolls of cash in the arrestee’s pockets
during the pat-down search incident to arrest.264
Apparent intoxication is another factor the Wyoming Supreme Court
considers to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists under the ofﬁcer safety
prong to support a search incident to arrest.265 In -ICHIGAN V ,ONG, the United
States Supreme Court considered the appellants apparent intoxication to support
a ﬁnding of reasonable suspicion during an investigatory stop.266 Wyoming
similarly recognized, in #LARK V 3TATE, the inﬂuence of alcohol on a suspect raises
ofﬁcer safety concerns.267 Notably, evidence of intoxication is absent from the
facts of 0IERCE and Holman.268
The ratio of ofﬁcers to suspects at the time of arrest is another factor
supporting a ﬁnding of reasonable suspicion under the ofﬁcer safety prong of the
search incident to arrest exception.269 The presence of other vehicle passengers in
the presence of a single ofﬁcer presents ofﬁcer safety concerns because the suspects
outnumber the ofﬁcer.270 This factor bears relevance under Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence in determining whether a suspect can potentially reach weapons
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0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 531; Holman, 183 P.3d at 374.
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See supra notes 29–30, 184 (searching the person is the foundation of the search incident
to arrest exception).
263

0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 531 (“The ofﬁcer’s pat-down search of the appellant’s person did not
reveal anything of evidentiary value.”). This court only lists this factor in 0IERCE. Compare id., WITH
Holman, 183 P.3d at 374.
264

Brief of Appellee, Sam, supra note 114, at 5; Brief of Appellant, Sam, supra note 114, at 4–5;
see Sam, 171 P.3d at 1174–76, 1178 (stating the facts of the case).
265

Holman, 183 P.3d at 374; 0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 531; #LARK, 138 P.3d at 679, 682 (detecting
the odor of alcohol while standing outside the vehicle raised ofﬁcer safety concerns); see Fender v.
State, 74 P.3d 1220, 1228 n.4 (Wyo. 2003) (citations omitted) (dicta).
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463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983).

267

138 P.3d at 679, 682.

268

Holman, 183 P.3d at 372–74; 0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 527–32.

269

Holman, 183 P.3d at 374; 0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 531.

270

Fender, 74 P.3d at 1226–27 (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413–15 (1997)).
Fender presents a comprehensive discussion of the relationship between additional passengers and
ofﬁcer safety concerns under the Fourth Amendment. Id.; see also 3 LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 7.1(b)
(4) (discussing the extent of control police have over the scene of arrest when outnumbered by
suspects).
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or evidence.271 The Wyoming Supreme Court similarly recognized the ofﬁcer
to defendant ratio in the search incident to arrest exception in Cotton v. State:
the presence of another passenger raised an ofﬁcer safety concern that justiﬁed a
search of the vehicle’s interior and the pockets of a particular shirt.272 The presence
of a passenger also appeared in #LARK.273 This factor appeared in Sam, although
not discussed, and helps reconcile the case with the rest of the triumvirate: the car
in Sam contained an additional passenger during the arrest.274
Another factor the court considers when evaluating whether reasonable
suspicion supports either the evidentiary or ofﬁcer safety prong of the search
incident to arrest exception is the handcufﬁng and isolation of the defendant
in the back of a patrol car during the search.275 Once an arrestee is taken into
custody, the two justiﬁcations for a search incident to arrest—preventing the
arrestee from reaching weapons or evidence—cannot be met because the arrestee
cannot physically reach anything.276
The court also considers special information the ofﬁcer knows about the
suspect before the encounter, and the suspect’s demeanor during the encounter.277
In 6ASQUEZ, the suspect demonstrated an agitated demeanor throughout the trafﬁc
stop.278 In #LARK, one of the suspects acted suspiciously by disappearing from view
and concealing a container during the trafﬁc stop.279 Special information includes
information the ofﬁcer knows about the suspect from prior criminal charges or
activity, as in #LARK: the ofﬁcer recognized one of the vehicle’s occupants from a
former drug charge.280 This is another factor appearing in Sam that helps reconcile
the case with the rest of the Holman triumvirate: prior to the arrest, the ofﬁcer
received special information that Sam violated a protective order for several days,
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3 LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 7.1(b)(4).

272

Cotton, 119 P.3d at 935–36; #LARK, 138 P.3d at 682; 6ASQUEZ, 990 P.2d at 489.

273

#LARK, 138 P.3d at 679, 682.

274

Sam, 171 P.3d at 1175.

275

Holman, 183 P.3d at 374; 0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 531.

Belton v. U.S., 453 U.S. 454, 466 (1981) (Brennan, J. dissenting); see also 3 LAFAVE, supra
note 34, § 7.1(b) (deﬁning the area in an arrestee’s “immediate control” by the ability to reach
weapons or evidence). Wyoming recognizes that a handcuffed suspect still presents some ofﬁcer
safety concerns. Fender, 74 P.3d at 1129 n.5 (discussing the ability of handcuffed suspects to harm
ofﬁcers). Suspects also present ofﬁcer safety concerns even inside the patrol car. Mackrill v. State,
100 P.3d 361, 369–70 (Wyo. 2004) (citations omitted).
276

277

Holman, 183 P.3d at 374; 0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 531.

278

6ASQUEZ, 990 P.2d at 479.

#LARK, 138 P.3d at 682; see also 68 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 196, § 118 (discussing furtive
activities by defendants including hiding items as the ofﬁcer approaches).
279

#LARK, 138 P.3d at 682; see also 68 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 196, § 119 (discussing the
signiﬁcance of the ofﬁcer’s knowledge of the defendant and other suspicious information).
280
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and just minutes before, his stop and arrest.281 By contrast, in 0IERCE and Holman,
the ofﬁcers had no special information about the suspects, who behaved normally
throughout the encounter.282
The time of day and the location of the arrest can support a ﬁnding of
reasonable suspicion under the ofﬁcer safety prong of the search incident to
arrest exception.283 Arrests taking place at night or in high crime areas support
a reasonable suspicion of ofﬁcer safety concerns.284 This factor weighed against
a ﬁnding of reasonable suspicion in Holman because the arrest occurred during
daylight hours near a public park in the presence of hundreds of people.285

CONCLUSION
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in Holman indicates that under the
search incident to arrest exception, the reasonable under all of the circumstances
test is satisﬁed if reasonable grounds indicate the vehicle contains weapons or
evidence.286 The correct standard of reasonable grounds to apply is reasonable
suspicion.287 Furthermore, Holman modiﬁed the reasonable under all of the
circumstances test by only including some factors in its search incident to arrest
analysis.288 The only circumstances considered are those that support a ﬁnding
of reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains weapons or contraband.289
Factors supporting probable cause are explicitly excluded from the analysis.290
These factors stabilize Wyoming’s search incident to arrest jurisprudence by
demonstrating continuity in this area of case law and provide helpful guidance to
law enforcement and practitioners.291

281
Sam, 171 P.3d at 1178 (discussing Sam’s pattern of violating the protective order for days
before his arrest).
282

Holman, 183 P.3d at 374; 0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 531.

283

Holman, 183 P.3d at 374; 0IERCE, 171 P.3d at 531.

284

Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 638 (Wyo. 2000) (holding the time of day and a history of
crime in the area presented ofﬁcer safety concerns); see also 68 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 196, § 119
(courts consider the general area or neighborhood when evaluating searches incident to arrest).
285

Holman, 183 P.3d at 374; Brief of the Appellant, Holman, supra note 2, at 2.

286

See supra notes 188–94 and accompanying text (reviewing the reasonable basis
requirement).
287

See supra notes 201–29 and accompanying text (advocating for reasonable suspicion as the
logical standard).
288

See supra notes 230–85 and accompanying text (reviewing the factors the court ﬁnds
irrelevant).
289

See supra notes 250–85 and accompanying text (evaluating factors supporting a ﬁnding of
reasonable suspicion).
290

See supra notes 235–49 and accompanying text (evaluating abrogated factors).

291

See supra notes 250–85 and accompanying text (noting the role of factors throughout the
small body of law).
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